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India and Eastphalia
DAVID P. FIDLER* AND SUMIT GANGULY**

I. INTRODUCTION: ENIGMATIC INDIA

Much of the attention paid to the growth in the political, economic,
and strategic importance of Asia focuses on East and Southeast Asia,
with China's rise featuring most prominently in analyses. This
symposium reflects this pattern because it predominantly contains
articles that explore the potential impact of China's emergence as a
great power.' However, examination of the possible development of an
international order influenced by Asian power and ideas must also
include consideration of the other big, emerging Asian power-India.2
This article explores India's complex role in the potential dawning and
functioning of an Eastphalian international system.
As other articles in this symposium reveal, China will have a
significant impact on international politics and economics in the twenty* James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of
Law-Bloomington; Director, Indiana University Center on American and Global
Security.
** Rabindranath Tagore Professor of Indian Cultures and Civilizations and Professor
of Political Science, Indiana University-Bloomington; Director, Indiana University's
India Studies Program; Director of Research, Indiana University Center on American and
Global Security.
1. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Eastphalia as the Perfection of Westphalia, 17 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 27 (2010) (concentrating mainly on China's role in the possible

emergence of an Eastphalia order); Men Honghua, East Asian OrderFormationand SinoJapanese Releations, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 47 (2010); Yanzhong Huang,

PursuingHealth as Foreign Policy: The Case of China, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105
(2010); Sung Won Kim, Human Security with an Asian Face? 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 83 (2010) (focusing predominantly on East Asian influences on the future of human

security); Chang-fa Lo, Values to be Added to Eastphaliaby the Emerging China, 17 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 13 (2010).
2. See, e.g., Sung Won Kim, David P. Fidler & Sumit Ganguly, Eastphalia Rising?
Asian Influence and the Fate of Human Security, WORLD POL'Y J., Summer 2009, at 53, 53

(including India in analysis of the possible development of an Eastphalian world order).
On India's emergence as a great power, see ARVIND PANAGARIYA, INDIA: THE EMERGING
GIANT (2008); ASHLEY TELLIS, INDIA AS A NEW GLOBAL POWER: AN ACTION AGENDA FOR
THE UNITED STATES (2005).
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first century. But, in many ways, the story of India's rise to putative
great power status, and its potential contributions to the nature of an
Eastphalian world, is perhaps more interesting and complicated. India
is the world's largest democracy and is deeply committed to political
tenets, such as the importance of a secular government, peaceful
transitions of power after elections, an independent judiciary, a vigorous
media and press, and civilian control of the military, that resonate with
the democratic and human rights ideals espoused globally by Western
powers in North America and Europe. Yet, India equally embraces
principles that stand in opposition to the Western-led push for global
democratization and its attendant human rights, namely the principles
of sovereignty and nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other
states. Thus, India is much more of an enigma in the emergence of an
Eastphalian world than China.
To make sense of this enigma, our analysis unfolds in five parts.
First, we look at features of India's economic and political rise in the
past ten to fifteen years in order to give the reader a sense of India's
place in the shift of power and influence in international relations
toward Asia.
Second, we examine India's commitment to the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence as an ordering framework for India's worldview
and foreign policy.4 In this respect, India walks side-by-side with other
Asian countries, including China, which also ground their foreign
relations in the Five Principles.'
Third, we argue that despite India's increasing geopolitical
prominence, Indian leaders have failed to develop consistent and
coherent strategies for India in relation to the shifts taking place in
world politics and economics. 6 An Eastphalian system may well be
emerging, but India seems, at present, to be drifting without a clear
perspective of its strategic objectives and role in this new world order.
Fourth, we argue that India's indecisiveness may combine with
massive domestic problems the country faces, such as crippling levels of
continuing poverty, to render Indian power and influence increasingly
impotent in and irrelevant to the evolution of an Eastphalian world
order.7 In short, India's day in the Eastphalian sun might be short,
leaving the field to China and its rivals to shape and compete over.

3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 34; Kim, Fidler & Ganguly, supra note 2, at 58-59
(both discussing the importance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to Asian
countries).
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part V.
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Fifth, we explore whether India could carve a path other than
irrelevance, a path that would instead make India the indispensable
nation in stabilizing the Eastphalian world. 8 By "indispensable" we
mean the country that becomes the broker for balancing material power
and ameliorating ideational differences. In other words, India could
bridge East and West in the multipolar world this century will
experience and, in the process, play a decisive role in melding the
lingering promise of democracy with the stubborn imperative of
sovereignty.

II. INCREDIBLE INDIA
Prognosticators of world politics often predict that the rise of China
and India will contribute significantly to reshaping the structure and
dynamics of international affairs. Although China tends to gain more
sustained speculation in these geopolitical parlor games, the growing
economic, political, and strategic importance of India has not gone
unnoticed. India's post-Cold War trajectory of economic growth provides
compelling evidence of a country experiencing unprecedented, historymaking shifts in its capabilities and potential material power and global
influence. Once enamored with socialist central planning and autarkic
economic policies (which left it with a bloated bureaucracy, inefficient
industries, and anemic economic development), India has become more
economically open, dynamic, and interconnected with world flows of
goods, services, and capital. This dramatic change, which occurred in
less than a generation, has made India a global economic player as
never before in its history.
Politically and strategically, India has also experienced newly
earned prominence on the global stage. Not only has India continued to
function as a vibrant democracy, with regular and peaceful elections
taking place in one of the world's most populous and diverse countries,
but it has also become, by virtue of its size, capabilities, and potential,
more strategically significant for other great powers, especially the
United States and China. The Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation
accord struck in 20079 illustrates India's new strategic importance
because this deal not only recognized the legitimacy of India's status as
a nuclear-weapons state, but also demonstrated the American need to
improve security and political ties with India as a hedge against the
relative decline in U.S. power as Chinese power and multipolarity looms

8. See infra Part VI.
9. On this accord, see Sumit Ganguly & Dinshaw Mistry, The Case for the U.S.-India
Nuclear Agreement, WORLD POL'YJ., Summer 2006, at 11, 11.
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on the global horizon.
India also has new stature in other political arenas, including
multilateral actions to stabilize Afghanistan and prevent Pakistan from
imploding, negotiations within the World Trade Organization, and
diplomatic efforts to address the threat of climate change. India's
relations with Iran also factor into strategies being contemplated in the
United States, Europe, and the United Nations (U.N.) concerning how
to handle Iran's feared acquisition of the capability to make nuclear
weapons. As discussed more in Part III below, India's positions on
controversial countries (e.g., Myanmar) and global policy initiatives
(e.g., advocacy for the principle of the responsibility to protect) cannot be
ignored. Although serious reform of the U.N. Security Council is
unlikely to occur, India's argument that it should become a new
permanent member of the Council has political plausibility because of
the country's increasing significance across the range of pressing issues
characterizing contemporary international relations.
These examples of India's waxing importance connect to perceptions
that power and influence in world affairs are shifting toward Asia. This
shift is not simply about China specifically or East Asia more generally
because India, the South Asian giant, adds considerable weight to the
phenomenon of Asia's new place in the international system. India is a
key component of the potential arrival of Eastphalia, or an Asianinfluenced or Asian-centric world order. In short, India's power and
ideas will matter more in international affairs than at any other time
since becoming an independent state.
III. INDEPENDENT INDIA
Understanding how Indian power and ideas will matter more in
world politics requires insight into how India approaches foreign policy
and international relations. Certain major themes have historically
characterized India's worldview, especially its embrace of the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, leadership in the Non-Aligned
Movement, and promotion of the rights, needs, and solidarity of the
developing world. Unifying these positions is India's fierce sense of its
sovereignty and independence, a feature common in many post-colonial
states during the Cold War and particularly robust in Asia. During
India's transformation in the post-Cold War period, however, some
characteristic themes of Indian foreign policy have been rendered
obsolete by epochal events (e.g., India's interest in the Non-Aligned
Movement) or become less prominent because of India's growing power
and position (e.g., India's conceptualization of the developing world).
Despite these significant changes, India has remained firmly committed
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to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which continue to be the
foundation for India's staunch support for the principles of sovereignty
and noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states.
Generally speaking, the nature of Indian foreign policy during the
Cold War reflected its position as a poor, weak post-colonial state
coming into being in the midst of a dangerous bipolar international
system. India's experience as the crown jewel of the British Empire
forged in its founding generation of leaders a determination not to allow
the new democratic republic to fall under the sway of any other power.
Sovereignty, no matter how badly exercised, was the lifeblood of postimperial political, economic, and cultural independence for the peoples
of India. Indian leadership did not equate India's survival and growth
with close political and economic associations with other democracies
aligning themselves against the Soviet Union and the spread of
communism.
Thus, India was at the forefront of initiatives that served its need
for political space to operate as independently as possible in an
international order in which the superpowers tried to restrict the
flexibility and options of allies, enemies, and neutrals. Along with China
and Burma, India promulgated the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence (see box) in 1954 as a bulwark against the dangers of
foreign aggression, domination, or meddling in the affairs of vulnerable
countries. Realizing that making the Five Principles matter in the Cold
War system required some form of alliance, India and other countries
formed the Non-Aligned Movement to create more political solidarity
around the Principles and their application. Although this movement
was really another form of balancing in a balance of power system, it
served India's material interests and governing ideas to be in the
vanguard of the Movement.
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
1. Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty
2. Mutual nonaggression
3. Mutual noninterference in internal affairs
4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful coexistence
The Five Principles and the Non-Aligned Movement gave India a
platform from which to identify injustices it and other developing
countries faced and to articulate demands for changes in international
politics and economics to bolster the prospects for most of humanity.
Thus, India became a prominent champion of pro-developing country
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initiatives and "called for a global foreign aid regime designed to
redistribute the world's wealth, an international trading order that
favored the needs of the developing world, and the restructuring of such
global institutions as the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund so as to give the weaker states a greater voice."'
Conceptually, India's approach supported radical transformations in
the way international relations operated in the service of rather
conservative principles of world order-sovereignty, equality of states,
nonaggression, nonintervention, and cooperation for mutual benefit.
This strategy contrasted starkly with the prevailing views of the
competing blocs about how to end war and sustain peace-the universal
spread of specific types of political and economic systems. The counterintuitiveness of the Indian outlook created dilemmas, especially for the
theory and practice of international law. The effort to create new
international legal norms and rules related, for example, to global
economic justice did not fit well with the overarching emphasis on
sovereignty and noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states.
"You must give me more of your resources and money, but you have no
say whatsoever in how I utilize them" was not particularly compelling
logic in terms of how international law and governance mechanisms
should function in a system ostensibly based on achieving mutual
benefit through cooperation.
The determined emphasis by India and other countries on the
principles of sovereignty and noninterference had, of course, more basic
objectives in terms of international law, "1 particularly destroying the
vestiges of the discriminatory "standard of civilization" that informed
international law in the age of empire 2 and rooting out rules that
favored strong powers, such as the customary international law on
foreign direct investment, 13 norms in the law of the sea (e.g., the breadth
of the territorial sea and freedom of resource exploitation on the high
seas), 14 and trade rules that did not recognize the disadvantages
developing countries faced." India, in particular, took a prominent
stand against the discrimination and hypocrisy it sensed in the Nuclear
10. Sumit Ganguly, India's ForeignPolicy Grows Up, WORLD POL'Y J., Winter 2003-04,
at 41, 41.
11. For general analysis on India and international law, see R. P. ANAND, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAw AND INDIA (2005).
12. GERRIT W. GONG, THE STANDARD OF CIVILIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 90

(1984).
13. David P. Fidler, Revolt Against or From Within the West? TWAIL, the Developing
World, and the Future Direction of International Law, 2 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 29, 38-39
(2003).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 16 India insisted that it would not join
the NPT and give up its right to develop nuclear weapons when the NPT
privileged existing nuclear weapons states but did not effectively hold
them to their NPT disarmament obligations.' 7 A similar sense of
discrimination and hypocrisy informed India's antipathy towards the
U.N. Security Council's dominance by the Five Permanent Members."
Indian support for the Five Principles also meant that it was not
very enthusiastic about the post-Second World War development of
international human rights law, which justified the international
community intervening in the domestic affairs of states. Unlike other
democratic nations, India did not embrace the human rights revolution
in international law either as an instrument of power politics (as the
United States did against the Soviet Union) or as strategy of a new kind
of transnational governance (e.g., as the Europeans did through the
European Community and the European Convention on Human Rights).
India was not hostile to the political significance of rights because its
constitution recognized their importance;' 9 rather, India opposed outside
meddling in its domestic affairs by other states and international
organizations on the basis of human rights principles. To be sure, part
of this opposition stemmed from failures of the Indian government to
guarantee rights enshrined in the Indian Constitution and human
rights treaties India ratified; but the opposition also flowed from
application of the Five Principles. Another consequence of this approach
to human rights meant that democratic India would not be in the
vanguard, with the United States and European countries, of pressuring
other states to improve their human rights records.
Finally, India's experience with armed conflict with, and
interference in its territory by, Pakistan and China gave the Five
Principles deeper existential meaning for the Indian government and
steeled its resolve to protect its territorial and political independence
from foreign threats and meddling. Post-colonial India emerged into a
dangerous neighborhood, as illustrated by the conventional wars India
16. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. On India's perspective on this treaty, see ASHOK
KAPUR, INDIA's NUCLEAR OPTION: ATOMIC DIPLOMACY AND DECISION-MAKING 211 (1976).
17. Arundhati Ghose, Negotiating the CTBT" India's Security Concerns and Nuclear
Disarmament,J. INT'L AFF., Summer 1997, at 239, 256.
18. Dharam Shourie, IndiaMakes a Strong Case for UNSC Reform, HINDUSTAN TIMES
(New Delhi), Nov. 13, 2005, availableat http://web.archive.orgtweb/20060709065814/
http://www.hindustantimes.com/newsl6640_1544815,001600320005.htm.
19. See INDIA CONST. arts. 12-35 (detailing India's fundamental rights), available at
http://india.gov.in/govt/constitutions india.php. On the Indian Constitution generally, see
GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE
(1999).
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fought with Pakistan (1947-48, 1965, 1971, and 1999)20 and China
(1962)21 and the foreign-supported insurgency and terrorist movements
India countered within its territory since the first days of its
independence.22 These very real threats to its territorial integrity and
political survival inform India's hypersensitivity about its sovereignty
and independence.
The above description of India's historical support for the Five
Principles, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the transformation of the
well-being of peoples in developing countries does not, of course, mean
that India always followed these tenets and initiatives consistently or
coherently during the Cold War. For example, India intervened
militarily to stop atrocities in East Pakistan in 1971, leading to the
creation of Bangladesh,23 and in Sri Lanka in the 1980s.24 For many in
the West, India did not appear nonaligned in terms of its relationship
with the Soviet Union, which was more cozy and comfortable than
India's prickly-to-hostile attitude toward the United States. Indian
intransigence on the NPT was not universally applauded by many in
the developing world, who feared that India's stance would lead to
nuclear proliferation, which could place developing countries in even
more danger. Nevertheless, this background helps illuminate India's
fierce protection of its independence and sovereignty and its
unwillingness to participate in transformative legal or governance
projects that would undermine its and other countries' sovereignty and
independence through foreign intervention and interference, however
well intentioned. India's relative weakness during the Cold War
prevented Indian support for the Five Principles from having a
significant impact on the nature of international relations, dominated as
they were by the global, ideology-centric superpower conflict.

20. See SUMIT GANGULY, CONFLICT UNENDING: INDIA-PAKISTAN TENSIONS SINCE 1947
(2001).

21. See STEVEN A. HOFFMANN, INDIA AND THE CHINA CRISIS (1990).
22. On India's experiences with countering insurgencies, see INDIA AND
COUNTERINSURGENCY: LESSONS LEARNED (Sumit Ganguly & David P. Fidler eds., 2009);
RAJESH RAJAGOPALAN, FIGHTING LIKE A GUERRILLA: THE INDIAN ARMY AND
COUNTERINSURGENCY (2008); VIVEK CHADHA, Low INTENSITY CONFLICTS IN INDIA: AN

ANALYSIS (2005).
23. See ROBERT JACKSON, SOUTH ASIAN CRISIS: INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND BANGLADESH

(1975).
24. NEIL DEVOTTA, BLOWBACK: LINGUISTIC NATIONALISM, INSTITUTIONAL DECAY, AND
ETHNIC CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA 172-73 (2004).
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IV. INDECISIVE INDIA
Like many countries, India experienced significant challenges in
reorienting its foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. In many
respects, India found itself on the losing end of its Cold War bets-the
Soviet Union collapsed; socialist-inspired economic planning was
discredited; and leading initiatives, such as the New International
Economic Order,25 to raise the political and economic status of the
developing world were dead and buried. In 1991, when India began its
market-oriented economic reforms, the prospect that India would be,
within a decade, projected as a rising great power was not very
plausible. Yet, India achieved this distinction despite being so badly
handicapped by many of its Cold War domestic and foreign policies.
The turn-about in India's fortunes resulted from three key changes
India undertook after the Cold War ended. The first change involved
opening its economy and connecting it more directly with the global
marketplace for goods, services, and capital. Through economic reforms,
the Indian economy began to obtain eye-catching rates of economic
growth that left the old cynicism about the lethargic "Hindu rate of
growth" in the dust.2 6
The second major change involved a gradually broadening
rapprochement with the United States. India expressed concerns about
the United States' emergence as a "hyperpower" in the immediate postCold War period,2 7 but Indian leaders realized that they had to improve
relations with Washington because nonalignment no longer made any
tactical or strategic sense. U.S. foreign direct investment in India,
especially in the outsourcing of services, was part of what was fueling
Indian economic growth. Although uncomfortable with the extent of
U.S. power and influence, and not on the same page with the United
States on many issues, India did not perceive the United States as any
kind of existential threat to its survival, political independence, or
territorial integrity. In fact, democratically and economically reforming
India was not on the Americans' "end of history" agenda to spread
democracy, capitalism, and human rights globally in the aftermath of
the Cold War. Through steps small (e.g., increasing military-to-military
cooperation 28) and large (e.g., the negotiation of the Indo-U.S. civilian

25. See Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201 (May 1, 1974).
26. See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, INDIA IN TRANSITION: FREEING THE ECONOMY 84-98 (1993).
27. Ganguly, supra note 10, at 44.
28. See US-INDIAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: MORE
THAN WORDS (Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup & Andrew Scobell eds., 2006).
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nuclear accord29), India remade its relationship with the United States.
The third change involves India's rethinking of its place and role in
the post-Cold War world. Freed from the confines of nonalignment, and
increasingly integrated into the global economy, India had to reconsider
strategic and political assumptions informing its foreign policy and
shaping formulation of its national interest. Increasingly, India began to
think and act more like a traditional great power than a weak, poor
country trying to buy time and space to find its feet. Its economic
reforms and adaptation to better relations with the United States
illustrate this shift, as does India's abandonment of transformative
schemes to redistribute wealth globally and save the developing world
from exploitation. India also began to try to advance its interests and
exert its influence in new ways, suggestive of a broadening global
perspective on its power. For example, India intensified its diplomatic
relations and economic cooperation with Southeast Asia,3 ° China,3 the
33
32
Middle East, and Africa.
Although India managed to maneuver deftly in the turbulence of the
post-Cold War period, its adjustments were borne of painful necessity
rather than deliberate, visionary grand strategy. Often overlooked in
the self-congratulatory atmosphere of India's rise is the reality that the
nature of the post-Cold War system, especially American political and
economic quasi-hegemony, provided India with the political space and
economic opportunities to change course dramatically. In other words,
India's transformation was dependent on which superpower won the
Cold War, and, ironically, it was not the superpower the Indians had
preferred during the Cold War. India's remarkable economic and
diplomatic renaissance largely occurred on the coattails of American
power and influence.
This context helps explain why, as American power declines,
somewhat rapidly, relative to other great powers, India appears
awkwardly indecisive about what it wants to do with its new power and
influence. As the center for geopolitics shifts towards Asia, and as Asian
powers, such as India and China, increasingly have louder voices,
backed by material power, in shaping the course of multilateral
cooperation, international law, and global governance, the need for

29. See Ganguly & Mistry, supranote 9.
30. See Rajiv Sikri, India's Look East Policy, ASIA-PACIFIC REv., May 2009, at 131, 13144.
31. See AMARDEEP ATHWAL, CHINA-INDIA RELATIONS: CONTEMPORARY DYNAMICs
(2008).
32. See PRITHVI RAM MUDIAM, INDIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST (1994).
33. See Harry G. Broadman, China and India Go to Africa: New Deals in the
Developing World, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2008, at 95.
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clarity as to what directions India and China want to take international
relations increases. In short, what is India's vision for an Eastphalian
international system and for its role in that system?
As Ganguly and Pardesi argued, "One of the hallmarks of a major
power is that it tries to shape its strategic environment proactively
rather than reacting on an ad hoc basis when challenges loom or
opportunities arise. Thus far, India has shown little political
imagination in shaping its strategic milieu." 34 India's indecisiveness as
the Asian-centric international milieu evolves has many possible
sources, but two leading reasons are its continued commitment to the
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the serious material
constraints and domestic problems India still confronts. In other words,
India has not yet developed either the mindset or the means to think
and act as a full-fledged great power. As one commentator put it, India
has become a35big power, but has not demonstrated it knows how to be a
great power.
In terms of India's sustained and strong embrace of the Five
Principles, the world has seen demonstrations of this reality in India's
determined opposition to the application of the purported principle of
the responsibility to protect (R2P) in specific cases, namely in the
aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar 36 and the end of the Tamil
Tiger insurgency in Sri Lanka. 37 In both cases, India stood shoulder-toshoulder with China and other Asian countries in publicly opposing any
R2P intervention into the domestic affairs of Myanmar and Sri Lanka.
Less overtly, India has not severed its economic and political ties with
Sudan,38 despite the ongoing atrocities in that nation and the
indictment of Sudan's president for war crimes by the International
Criminal Court (which India has not joined). The reasons for "business
as usual" with Sudan relate to India's implementation of the Five
Principles and its material interests in Sudanese oil and other economic
opportunities. Similarly, India ferociously criticizes any foreign

34. Sumit Ganguly & Manjeet Pardesi, India Rising: What is New Delhi to Do?, WORLD
POL'Y J., Spring 2007, at 9, 16.
35. Philip Stephens, India Faces a Choice: Is it a Big Power or a Great Power?, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, available at http://www.ft.com/cmsls/0/92dbb440-14bc-llde-8cdl0000779fd2ac.html?nclickcheck=l.
36. No Shelter from the Storm: Cyclone in Myanmar, THE ECONOMIST, May 10, 2008, at
78. On the attempted application of the R2P principle to Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis,
see ASIA-PACIFIc CENTRE FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, CYCLONE NARGIS AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY
TO
PROTECT
(MYANMAR/BuRMA
BRIEFING
No.
2)
(2008),

http://www.r2pasiapacific.orgldocuments/Burma Brief2.pdf.
37. Sri Lankcr UN Rights Council Fails Victims, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, May 27,
2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/05/27/sri-lanka-un-rights-council-fails-victims.
38. See Kim, Fidler & Ganguly, supranote 2, at 61.
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complaints about its government's behavior within India, particularly
concerning human rights concerns related to Indian military and
security forces deployed in Kashmir.3 9
Certainly for many in other democratic countries, India's hostility to
R2P, refusal to alter political and economic relations with atrocitygenerating regimes, and ironclad denial that any entity or person
outside the Indian citizenry has anything to criticize about the Indian
government's activities in Kashmir or any other part of its territory is
troubling politically, particularly as a vision of how an Asian-centric
international order might function. But, India's continued adherence to
the Five Principles is only part of the story.
We also have to keep in mind that, despite its rapid rise to
prominence, India continues to suffer serious constraints on its material
power and what it can do with it. For example, India remains utterly
dependent on foreign sources of oil and natural gas, and as its economy
continues to grow, this dependence increases.40 India's need for oil and
natural gas is a geopolitical imperative and vulnerability, and India can
scarcely afford to alienate key suppliers of these sources of energy
supplies, such as Myanmar, Iran, and Sudan. Conveniently, the Five
Principles provide political cover for diplomacy designed to reduce
India's vulnerability to energy supply shortages or crises.
In addition, India still lives in a dangerous neighborhood, which is
becoming more volatile because of the faltering counterinsurgency
campaign in Afghanistan,4' the fragility of nuclear-armed Pakistan,42
the domestic unrest and repression in Iran,43 the mounting signs of
state failure in Myanmar," and the increase in Islamic terrorist

39. Stephens, supra note 35 ('Many see resolution of the Kashmir problem as vital to
stable democratic government in Pakistan and, ultimately, to permanent peace in
Afghanistan. For a foreign politician to say as much is to invite bitter denunciation for
interference in India's internal affairs.").
40. See Manjeet S. Pardesi & Sumit Ganguly, Energy Security and India's
Foreign/SecurityPolicy, in INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A UNIPOLAR WORLD 99 (Harsh Pant
ed., 2008).
41. See, e.g., George F. Will, Time to Get Out of Afghanistan, WASH. POST, Sept. 1,
2009, at A12.
42. See, e.g., South Asia
Terrorism Portal, Pakistan Assessment 2009,
http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/index.htm# ("Pakistan's descent towards state
failure gathered momentum in year 2008. Conflict data and broad governance indicators

demonstrate that Pakistan is, today, a nation at war with itself.").
43. For human rights reporting on the situation in Iran, see Amnesty International,

Iran's PresidentialElection Amid Unrest and Ongoing Human Rights Violations, June 5,
2009, http://www.amnesty.org/er/iran-election-unrest.
44. See ForeignPolicy.com, The Failed State Index 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed-statesindexinteractivemapand rankings
(ranking Burma as a failed state in critical condition) (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
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exploitation of ungoverned spaces in Bangladesh.45 South Asia
constitutes a regional albatross around India's great power aspirations,
which limits its freedom of action, both in terms of ideas for engaging
countries diplomatically and how it deploys elements of its national
power. India's need to address these existing and increasing threats
focuses the attention of its leaders on narrow but powerful interests
related to national security, leaving reduced inclinations for a broader
"vision thing" for an Asian-influenced international order.
The combination of the continued centrality of the Five Principles in
Indian foreign policy thinking and material and security constraints on
India's power and influence help explain India's indecisiveness with
respect to a discernable strategic vision for its role in the emerging
Asian-centric international system. Overcoming this indecisiveness will
require dramatic changes in either India's commitment to the Five
Principles or the material and regional circumstances adversely
affecting Indian interests, power, and influence. Otherwise, India may
be a player in any emerging Eastphalian order, but it may not leave any
distinctive mark on it.
V. IRRELEVANT INDIA?
A more sobering possibility is that India emerges as irrelevant to
the processes that will shape the shift of power and influence toward
Asia. This scenario would unfold if India's massive domestic problems
corrode India's global influence and cannibalize its material power.
These internal problems may force Indian governments to focus more
resources and political capital internally to thwart security threats from
terrorist and insurgent groups,4 reduce still unacceptably high levels of
poverty,47 stave off deterioration in educational services,48 control
45. See, e.g., Ajit Doval, Islamic Terrorism in South Asia and India's Strategic
Response, 3
POLICING: J. POLY & PRAC.
63, 66 (2007), available at
http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/fulll/1/63 ('The situation in Bangladesh has
fast deteriorated after September 11, 2001, [more] than is normally understood. When
Pakistan and Afghanistan came under pressure, a good number of terrorists, reportedly
with Pak[istani] intelligence support, found Bangladesh as safe haven.").
46. Perhaps the most serious of these threats comes from the Maoist Naxalite
movement. See Jennifer L. Oetken, Counterinsurgency against Naxalites in India, in
INDIA AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: LESSONS LEARNED 127, 127-151 (Sumit Ganguly &
David P. Fidler eds., 2009).
47. Andrew Shepherd & Aasha Kapur Mehta, Chronic Poverty in India: An
Introduction, in CHRONIC POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN INDIA 23, 23 (Aasha
Kapur Mehta & Andrew Shepherd eds., 2006) (noting persistence of "unacceptably high
levels of poverty and hunger" in India).
48. Priyanka Bhardwaj, India's Education Mess, ASIA SENTINEL, Aug. 17, 2009,
http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=2009&Itemid
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burgeoning communicable and noncommunicable disease problems,4 9
manage the burdens a growing population will impose on rickety and
inadequate public health and health care systems, 50 and address the
domestic consequences of climate change, particularly the possibilities
of dramatic and adverse alterations in the Himalayan snow melt,
seasonality of monsoons, and coastal storm patterns.5' In short, India's
domestic travails could unravel its ambitions to be a big power, let alone
a great power, in the emerging Asian-influenced international system,
leaving the field essentially to China and East Asian countries to shape
vis-A-vis the United States and European nations.
Domestic political and economic deterioration has gutted great
powers throughout history, as illustrated by Rome rotting from within,
Czarist Russia imploding into communist revolution, and the Soviet
Union disintegrating from the inside out. India's predicament may be
even more brittle because its status as a great power is nascent and, in
the eyes of many, still tenuous, making this stature even more
vulnerable to erosion by worsening domestic problems.5 2 India's list of
internal problems is long and growing, obscured sometimes by the flush
of national pride and enthusiasm for India's rise in global significance.
But, as the saying goes, all politics are ultimately local, and India's
desire to be an Asian power that is active, acknowledged, and respected
globally may vanish among the slums, civil insecurity, inadequate social
services, and poor governance that continues to plague India's future.
India's material power vis-A-vis other countries is simply not significant
enough at present to make its domestic problems just a domestic
matter.
In that context, addressing these domestic problems more robustly
will siphon off political and economic resources on a large scale, which
may delay or stunt India's maturation as a great political, military, and
=404 (noting that "India ranks 102nd of 129 countries, below Kenya and Nicaragua, in the
UNESCO 2009 Education for All Development Index.").
49. See NAT'L COMM'N ON MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH, BURDEN OF DISEASE IN
INDIA (2005), availableat http://www.whoindia.orgLinkFiles/Commision-on_
MacroeconomicandHealth_03-NCMHBurden of disease_(29_Sep.2005).pdf
(identifying 17 diseases or conditions that required priority policy attention).
50. See, e.g., Arvind Panagariya, The Crisis in Rural Health Care, ECONOMIC TIMES
(India), Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0124_healthcare_
panagariya.aspx.
51. Padmaparna Ghosh, How Jairam Ramesh Will Balance Growth and Ecology,
LIVEMINT.COM, June 5, 2009, http://www.livemint.com/2009/06/04225504/How-JairamRamesh.will-balance.html (India's Minister of Environment and Forests stating that
"[t]he Himalayan glaciers are receding, agricultural yields are stagnating, dry days have
increased, [and] patterns of monsoon have become more unpredictable.").
52. China's rise to great power status also faces challenges from its significant
domestic problems.
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economic power. India need not become a "failed state" for the domestic
drain on its political capital and economic resources to sidetrack its
climb to great power status. This internal '"lack hole" could make India
less significant internationally, more vulnerable to outside pressure and
threats, and marginalize India's role in the emerging multipolar, Asianoriented world. In this scenario, India's continued support for the Five
Principles would not distinguish Indian ideas from those of China or
other Asian countries, reducing even further the likelihood of any
distinctive Indian contributions to diplomatic endeavors, international
law, or global governance.
VI. INDISPENSABLE INDIA?

Rather than irrelevance, an alternative path for India would be for
it to become the power that stabilizes and shapes the shift to an
Eastphalian order by acting as the bridge between East and West in the
context of the multipolarity this century is expected to experience. India
has characteristics that give it, potentially, a unique place at the table
of the great powers. Its long-functioning, vibrant democracy gives India
political standing with the West that China does not have, nor is
expected to have for decades.5 3 India's sensibilities about sovereignty,
political and territorial independence, and noninterference give it
credibility among those nations, especially in Asia, that have made the
Five Principles the basis of their international intercourse. 54 India's
sensitivity to the plight of developing nations would also give it stature
with the developing world. Under this perspective, India could emerge
as the linchpin power of an Eastphalian order.
To play this role, India would have to develop a strategic vision of its
responsibilities as a great power that goes beyond reactive policies to
events (no matter how deftly handled) and ritual incantation of the Five
Principles. As noted earlier, India has, so far, proved unable or
unwilling to think and act proactively and strategically about its power
and its ideas in the context of the shifting of world affairs toward Asia.
Moving from crisis to crisis and filling the gaps with use of the Five
Principles will put India in the perpetual defensive position of adjusting

53. For a detailed analysis of India's support for democracy promotion, see Jan
Cartwright, India's Regional and International Support for Democracy: Rhetoric or
Reality?, 49 ASIAN SURV. 403 (2009).
54. Japan, as another significant Asian power, is unlikely to be able to play the kind of
East-West bridging role envisioned here for India because of its close alliance with the
United States and its historical problems with China. More generally, Japan's power and
influence in Asia are perceived by experts to be declining. See, e.g., Aurelia George
Mulgan, Why Japan Can't Lead, WORLD POL'Y J., Summer 2009, at 101, 110.
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its policies to events shaped by other powers, especially China and the
United States. In such a position, the other powers may not be able to
ignore India, but they will not have to take it as seriously as if India had
developed a strategy and the means to move Eastphalia in specific
directions.
India as the linchpin power would have to be able to balance
material power among rival states and craft ways in which states can
cooperate more effectively on improving human security within
countries. In the multipolar nineteenth century, Great Britain acted as
the "balancer" in the balance of power, 55 and it restrained the aggressive
interventionism favored by the Holy Alliance of Russia, Prussia, and
Austria 6 while working to address humanitarian problems, such as the
slave trade. 7
India could play a similar set of roles in the emerging Asian-centric,
multipolar system. It could stabilize Eastphalia by making sure neither
China nor the United States felt sufficiently emboldened or threatened
to upset the balance of power. Similarly, India could act as a broker
between the universalist sentiments of Western powers, which gravitate
towards interventions in the domestic affairs of other states, and the
nationalistic preferences of Asian and other non-Western States to
emphasize sovereignty and noninterference. The key to melding the
promise of democracy and human rights with the stubborn imperative of
sovereignty is the ability to demonstrate the benefits of reform and to
provide or facilitate functional, workmanlike assistance without raising
the stakes of reform to existential threats (e.g., regime change).
India could also show more leadership as the fulcrum of an
Eastphalian world by shouldering greater responsibilities and risks and
blazing trails that it could help others to follow. Such leadership could
be productively demonstrated in crafting approaches to difficult
collective action problems associated with globalization, including global
health and climate change. Playing this role would require India to be a
"first mover" in addressing problems, by unilaterally, bilaterally, or
55. EMERSON Niou, PETER C. ORDESHOOK & GREGORY F. ROSE, THE BALANCE OF
POWER: STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS 252 (1989) (commenting on Britain's role
as "balancer" in the balance of power).
56. FRANCIS H. HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN
THE HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES 106-08 (1967).
57. Huw Lewis-Jones, The Royal Navy and the Battle to End Slavery, BBC.coM, May
2, 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/abolition/royal-navyarticle-01.shtml ('CThe
Royal Navy's role in the suppression of the transoceanic slave trades represents a
remarkable episode of sustained humanitarian activity, involving patient diplomacy and
problematic wrangling over treaty arrangements, dangerous and exacting naval
operations, and intense political debate at home questioning the cost and purpose of the
patrols.").
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regionally experimenting with solutions to shared problems. Leadership
of this kind would give India more credibility as a potential source of
ideas and a problem solver rather than an absolutist adherent to the
Five Principles.
However, at this time, India is far from being in any position to be
the indispensable power of an Eastphalian system. It has not reached a
sufficient level of material power vis-A-vis other states to play the
"balancer," and it remains shackled to multiplying domestic problems
that will create increasing friction as India tries to move from being a
big power to a great power. In addition, India's attitude toward the Five
Principle seems inflexible, which, when combined with similar
approaches taken by China and other Asian countries, would make
Eastphalia a place where new international legal norms and global
governance innovations go to die. India also has not demonstrated much
in the way of "first mover" leadership because it has been intent to
pursue "India first" in its emergence as an Asian power and global
player. The slim prospects for India's emergence as the indispensable
Eastphalian power leaves the legal and governance possibilities of an
Asian-centric, multipolar system shrouded in uncertainty, potentially
subject to the harsher politics of an Asianized version of the security
dilemma, featuring the United States and China as the main
protagonists.
CONCLUSION

India's increased political and economic significance forms part of
the story of the shift in power and influence toward Asia. Thus, India
deserves to be analyzed as a factor in the potential emergence of an
Asian-centric international system and its impact on international law
and global governance. As we have argued, India's role in the possible
coming of an Eastphalian order is enigmatic for many reasons,
including the paradox of India's commitment to democracy internally
and its dedication to strong principles of sovereignty and
noninterference internationally. This situation creates confusion and
potential conceptual obstacles for Indian development of distinctive
contributions to the operation of legal rules and governance mechanisms
in Eastphalia. The enigma of India also involves the significant
uncertainty whether India will actually overcome external restraints on
its material power and freedom of action, as well as the persistent and
deepening governance, security, economic, and social problems
domestically to emerge as a great power peer with the United States
and China.
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Kamal Nath, India's former minister of commerce and industry,
captured the growing swagger among Indian elites when he said, 'We
no longer discuss the future of India. The future is India."58 To be sure,
the future of any Asian-centric, multipolar international order will be
affected by what happens to India because India has reached a level of
geopolitical critical mass that has to be reckoned with. But the mantra
that the "future is India" complacently obscures that this Indianinfluenced future may take very different forms, with each having its
own potential impact on how an Eastphalian world would function and
what role international law and global governance would have in this
world. Geopolitics is not a Bollywood or Hollywood adventure-India's
success in Eastphalia is not written.

58. Kamal Nath, Minister, Commerce & Indus., Speech at the 30th Anniversary of the
U.S.-India Business Council (June 3, 2005), www.indianembassy.org/pressrelease/
2005/June/3.htm.

